The year drawing to a close will be remembered by the world as a difficult one. The reasons for this are numerous — one of the most significant being the coronavirus pandemic. But 2020 also had its positives. One of them was Abkhazia's expression, for the first time in many years, of a desire to speak and cooperate with Tbilisi. Whether anything concrete will follow from this is difficult to say at this stage. But the very fact that the necessity of communication has finally been recognized is, without doubt, a positive development.

The need for dialogue and cooperation was openly voiced in Sukhumi as early as the beginning of this year — by Aslan Bzhania, who was at that point still a presidential candidate. Subsequently, against the backdrop of the increasingly cooling Russian-Abkhazian relationship and then the outright revelation of Moscow's plainly unfriendly and hostile intentions, similar statements were made by other Sukhumi representatives. Russia chose to show its "strategic friend" its true face at the most difficult possible moment — during the height of the pandemic — by cutting off Abkhazia's flow of financial assistance, imposing an effective medical blockade, and essentially torpedoing the tourist season. Finding itself in a crisis situation, Abkhazia's new leadership began seeking a way out of the impasse — without renouncing the "strategic partnership" with Russia, but seeking alternative possibilities. However, Moscow — which had spent a long time systematically engineering precisely this crisis — took extreme displeasure at the search for alternatives: it reminded Sukhumi of the "Program for the Formation of a Common Social and Economic Space Based on the Harmonization of Legislation" that had been sent under the previous authorities back in December of the previous year, envisaging in essence the social and economic subjugation of Abkhazia by Russia. Despite prolonged attempts to stall for time, Sukhumi's authorities were ultimately compelled, under pressure from the Russian "friend," to sign this document on November 12th. But fully understanding what its subsequent implementation would mean for Abkhazia — and that final annexation by Russia was no longer far off — Sukhumi did not abandon its attempts to seek alternative paths.

And a second document appeared, with the ambition of protecting Abkhazia's interests: in the "Foreign Policy Concept of Abkhazia," specifically Point 2.3, the possibility of communication with Tbilisi was stipulated for the first time in many years. "The Republic of Abkhazia allows for the possibility of creating conditions for establishing an additional format of multi-level negotiations between Georgia and the Republic of Abkhazia, within which it will be possible to discuss with the Georgian side issues of mutual interest that cannot be addressed within the framework of the International Geneva Discussions." Despite the active protest of the pro-Russian opposition — which declared that if implemented, this point would "not only relegate the Geneva Discussions to the background, but also lower the status of the negotiating process, and that as a result of the change in the status of negotiations, Abkhazia could not only lose its international mediators but formally revert to the period before international recognition" — the Abkhazian leadership chose not to return the document, approved by Aslan Bzhania, to the "parliament" for reconsideration. This means that Sukhumi's stated intention in Point 2.3 remains in force.

Yes, a couple of days ago there was a moment when, under pressure from pro-Russian revanchist opposition members, representatives of Bzhania's team appeared to backtrack — as "Foreign Minister" Daur Kove stated in response to political opponents' objections during the document's consideration, the opposition's view that the possible new format would amount to "tête-à-tête negotiations without mediators" was unfounded, since "nothing of the kind is written anywhere in the Concept." But then, on December 25th, in an interview given by the secretary of Abkhazia's "Security Council," Sergei Shamba, to the Georgian television channel Mtavari ("Main"), the subject was once again precisely that of direct dialogue. "It would be normal, if there is a conflict and there is a neighborly relationship, to talk and reach agreements with one another," Shamba stated. He once again confirmed that the Sukhumi "authorities" are prepared for direct dialogue with Tbilisi — despite the fact that both sides have their own "red lines." Shamba justified the necessity of resuming a dialogue that was once interrupted by "the existence of economic and humanitarian questions that can only be resolved through direct negotiations." In response to the question of whether there are any preconditions for the start of such negotiations, he answered in the negative: "The Abkhazian side has no prepared proposals of any kind. We have simply stated on multiple occasions that we are ready to talk." As for the concerns of the Abkhazian opposition that such a new negotiating format could negatively affect the International Geneva Discussions, Shamba does not share this view and is convinced that "the more channels there are for contact between the parties, the better — and it is generally better to talk to one another than to fight."

This is not the first such statement from the secretary of Abkhazia's "Security Council." Shamba has been speaking of the need to begin dialogue and cooperation with Tbilisi for nearly a year. Similar statements have been made by Aslan Bzhania, a number of other Abkhazian politicians, as well as by entrepreneurs, students, and ordinary residents of Abkhazia on social media. From Tbilisi, too, statements have been coming throughout this period — that negotiations are necessary, that there is no alternative to a peaceful resolution, and that the Georgian authorities are prepared to expand informal negotiations with Ossetian and Abkhazian society. But all of these statements have been fragmentary — Tbilisi has not, to this day, displayed a proactive position. And toward the end of the year, Foreign Minister David Zalkaliani even stated to the same Georgian television channel Mtavari that at this stage the Georgian side does not intend to begin direct negotiations in any new formats.

The main reason for this is precisely the same fears — concerns about the possible erosion of the only existing Geneva international negotiating format and a tête-à-tête conversation — that plague the pro-Russian Abkhazian opposition actively protesting against Point 2.3. The Georgian side is equally distrustful and equally fearful of direct dialogue with Sukhumi because of Russia — though with the shared enemy, Russia itself, it has been conducting direct dialogue without any such fears for years in the Abashidze-Karasin format. "It is quite clearly visible where the tendencies we have been observing in Sukhumi of late are coming from: Russia is doing everything in its power to disavow and distance itself from the obligations it assumed under the 2008 ceasefire agreement and from its obligation of the non-use of force. It is telling us, 'formalize this document with them [with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali].' But this approach will yield nothing!" Minister Zalkaliani declared.

Georgian analysts, however — including former diplomats with substantial experience of participation in the International Geneva Discussions, as well as the opposition — consider Tbilisi's passivity unacceptable. In their view, the document formalized on November 12th between Moscow and Sukhumi will accelerate Russia's annexation of Abkhazia, and therefore Tbilisi must use every available lever to, if not halt this process, at least delay it "until better times."

In the view of conflict analyst and member of the political council of the opposition party Lelo, Giorgi Kanashvili, dialogue would not be a problem if the current Georgian leadership had a concrete and consistent concept of relations with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. In that case, he believes, a mutually acceptable format could easily have been found and specific steps would already have been taken. "The ruling party — Georgian Dream — simply has no conceptual vision of what to do with the conflicts. Representatives of the current authorities regard any activity in this direction as risky, in the sense that any step will, in their view, be criticized by the opposition — especially against the backdrop of the drawn-out domestic political crisis. They are behaving strategically incorrectly, pushing state interests aside because of current domestic political events. In my view, such passivity is absolutely wrong and harmful. But if up to now our officials have generally made responsive statements only after some statement was made from the other side, we have of late been observing the complete silence of official Tbilisi in response to Sukhumi's proactivity. Toward the end of the year, a couple of statements were finally made — seemingly for the ears of our European partners — along the lines of 'we are also prepared to do something.' And that is all, so far," says Kanashvili.

Sergi Kapanadze — former Deputy Foreign Minister of Georgia and one of the leaders of the opposition European Georgia — shares his view. He attributes Tbilisi's passivity in part to "the absence of independent state institutions," but emphas that the ruling party's position does not ultimately change the position of the country and its people. "The existence of only declaratory policy is directly connected to our main affliction — the inability of institutions to take decisions independently, especially bold ones, combined with an absence of vision. The system created by Bidzina Ivanishvili conditions the paralysis of functioning in many areas. But there is one thing that the current incapacitated authorities think and do — or rather, do not do — and quite another what the aspirations and attitude of the Georgian people are toward Abkhazia, the Tskhinvali region, and their populations. This attitude is exclusively positive, oriented toward reconciliation and toward building trusting, the warmest possible relations for the future. Therefore I hope that in the future the problem will genuinely begin to be resolved — that there will be movement in terms of freedom of movement, that human relations will begin to develop, as will cooperation in the spheres of economy, trade, and other areas outside of politics," Kapanadze concludes.

And Paata Gaprindashvili, Director of the Georgian Reform Association (GRASS), proposes that the parties immediately begin intensive dialogue in the so-called 1.5 format. "Here in Tbilisi, it is time for us to recognize that the struggle for Abkhazia — as for the Tskhinvali region — is not only between Georgia and Russia; the struggle is between Moscow and Abkhazian society. Yes, we have not conducted a poll of the population on this subject there — for understandable reasons it is impossible — but believe me, the majority of residents do not wish for Abkhazia's incorporation into the Russian Federation," says Gaprindashvili. According to his information, at a recent meeting with Aslan Bzhania, Russian President Vladimir Putin "with his characteristic cynicism 'advised' Mr. Bzhania to cease his 'flirtation' with Tbilisi in order to avoid 'offending' Moscow and damaging the 'friendship.'" "What 'friendship' in Moscow's understanding actually means is well understood both by Aslan Bzhania personally and by the overwhelming majority of Abkhazia's population — for it was recently practically forced to accept yet another annexationist document, the 'Program for the Formation of a Common Social and Economic Space Based on the Harmonization of the Legislation of the Republic of Abkhazia and the RF,' which will cause the social and economic assimilation of Abkhazia into Russia," Gaprindashvili states. In his view, dialogue is not only necessary but possible in appropriate, mutually acceptable formats. "For instance, Sergei Shamba spoke at one point about the need to begin informal diplomacy through non-governmental organizations. And I would add that it is entirely possible to form intensive dialogue in the so-called 1.5 format. Such a format gives the relevant representatives of Tbilisi and Sukhumi the opportunity, so to speak, to meet painlessly at the same table and discuss cooperation in the areas of trade, education, medicine, and so on," concludes Paata Gaprindashvili.

Gvantsa Pipia

The material was prepared as part of a joint project of the Accent news agency and the non-governmental organization GRASS, implemented with the financial support of the Open Information Partnership (OIP).