The contract poisoning of opposition figure Navalny is ceasing to be merely a shameful, isolated criminal-political episode about one man. The affair is acquiring ever more new details — along with parallels to a multitude of other "mysterious" incidents apparently involving the same group of FSB officers. Moscow, as is customary, denies everything, calling the accusations "fabrications," "fabricated stories," and "provocations." But such cases — and the evidence obtained through various investigations initiated at the victims' behest — are multiplying, and it is hard to see how the Kremlin's assurances can remain convincing to anyone after the contrary has been confirmed by experts from several countries and by OPCW specialists alike.

But let us take things in order. Navalny was poisoned in Tomsk on August 20th of last year. He survived and is currently undergoing rehabilitation in Germany. In December, Navalny, the Bellingcat research group, and a number of media outlets published the results of an investigation, according to which an FSB team had been covertly following the opposition figure on his travels across Russia. The researchers were able to establish the names of the individuals involved and the fact that many of them had — and some still have — a connection to the programme for producing chemical warfare agents.

Subsequently, Navalny published a recording of a conversation with one of the alleged members of the group, who in effect admitted that an attempt had been made to kill the opposition figure.

Bellingcat claims to have obtained data on the movements of the alleged FSB officers from open sources, or by purchasing the relevant databases on the "black market." The authenticity of the database on the movements of the group in question has not been confirmed at this stage, but neither has it been refuted by any other sources. The FSB itself commented only on the recording of Navalny's conversation with its alleged officer, declaring it to be "a fabrication."

A couple of days ago, coincidences in timing were discovered between the movements of the alleged FSB officers implicated in the poisoning of Navalny and the deaths of two Caucasian activists. They were identified by social media users who had studied data on the FSB group's movements across Russia over the past several years, published by Bellingcat researcher Christo Grozev. Bellingcat itself has not yet analyzed this data, but announced that within the next two weeks it will publish an investigation, based on it, into other possible poisoning victims.

Social media users drew attention to the fact that one of the FSB officers who subsequently participated in the surveillance of Navalny was in Nalchik at the time when journalist, human rights activist, and member of the opposition movement Yabloko, 27-year-old Timur Kvashev, died there. He was found dead on August 1st, 2014. A bruise was discovered under his left eye and a needle mark in the area of his left armpit — giving grounds for insisting on a theory of violent death. No internal injuries were found, and experts suggested that the cause of death was poisoning by an unknown substance. Despite this, the official cause of death was recorded as "acute coronary insufficiency arising against the background of an unknown viral infection." The deceased's parents, friends, and colleagues dispute this conclusion and insist that Kvashev was murdered. In 2018, they filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights.

Several months later, in March 2015, one of the FSB officers mentioned in the Navalny investigation reportedly flew to Dagestan. And on those same days, activist of the civic movement "Unity," Ruslan Magomedragimov, was found dead there. The deceased's relatives claimed that two dots — resembling injection marks from a syringe — were visible on Magomedragimov's neck. They put forward the theory that he may have been poisoned with a substance that paralyzes the respiratory system, with asphyxiation given as the immediate cause of death.

Furthermore, officers mentioned in Christo Grozev's investigation flew to Nalchik in 2013 at approximately the same time when, under unexplained circumstances, Doku Umarov — the leader of the organization "Caucasus Emirate," banned in Russia — died there.

As early as December, Grozev had reported that the same officers had flown together to Grozny and Vladikavkaz. "It is impossible for such a unit with such specialists to exist solely because of one Navalny," the researcher noted, adding that the group had "other targets."

Against this backdrop, many in the Abkhazian segment of social media found themselves recalling the disturbing story of the highly suspicious and unexpected sudden illness of the then-presidential candidate and opposition leader Aslan Bzhania. On April 19th, 2019, he was hospitalized in Moscow, to which he had been transported from Sochi in a critical condition. Bzhania's breathing was impaired and he was unable to speak. A large dose of metals was found in the opposition figure's blood — in particular mercury and aluminium — which could only have appeared there as a result of external interference. Two days after Bzhania's hospitalization, his two bodyguards were brought to the same hospital with similar symptoms.

Aslan Bzhania subsequently underwent a course of intensive treatment in Germany and was unable to participate in the Abkhazian "presidential" elections at that time. However, the January 2020 revolution and the subsequent elections did ultimately bring him to power.

At that time, there was no shortage of theories about who might have ordered the alleged poisoning of Aslan Bzhania. One of the main ones rested on the question of who stood to benefit from the absence of the clear frontrunner in the upcoming 2019 "presidential" race. The party identified as the potential beneficiary of Bzhania's non-participation in the elections was the then incumbent "president" Raul Khajimba — backed by Moscow and personally by President Putin. However, an open connection between the alleged poisoning of the Abkhazian politician and Russia's influence in the region was not made at the time.

Now, following the publication of materials on the movements of the FSB officer group allegedly responsible for poisoning Russian opposition figure Navalny, the carefully forgotten story — in both Abkhazia and Russia — of the alleged poisoning of the now "president" Aslan Bzhania has received an unexpected sequel. It has emerged that in precisely those days of April 2019, the very same FSB officers of the Russian Federation who apparently poisoned Navalny were, for some reason, visiting the city of Sochi. As the well-known Russian propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov would say: "A coincidence? I don't think so."

It appears that within the FSB of present-day Russia, a "group of persons" conducting operations of this kind has long existed — and it very much appears that they are acting not on their own initiative, but on the orders of those to whom they are subordinate.

"The poisoning of Aslan Bzhania in 2019 — which is now being indirectly confirmed — was carried out on the instructions of the Kremlin. Whether the former Abkhazian president R. Khajimba asked his friend and partner to do it, or whether it was the initiative of the 'friend and partner' himself to 'help' R. Khajimba in the upcoming elections — is beside the point. What matters is that the Russian Federation is interfering in the political life of a neighboring country through inadmissible and criminal methods. What matters is that such a thing is possible at all in the 21st century. What matters is that, it seems, many in Abkhazia have their suspicions about the circumstances of Aslan Bzhania's poisoning — yet remain silent, preferring Russian financial assistance and assurances of friendship and partnership from the RF to the truth, while nonetheless regularly speaking of Abkhazia as an independent state," is written in the Abkhazian segment of social media.

Not so long ago, a meeting between A. Bzhania and V. Putin took place in Sochi, during which the Russian president stated: "Russia is Abkhazia's partner number one." But is this "partner" not rather too active, ladies and gentlemen?

Ekaterine Tsanava

The material was prepared as part of a joint project of the Accent news agency and the non-governmental organization GRASS, implemented with the financial support of the Open Information Partnership (OIP).