The Abkhazian opposition — among whose frontrunners are a sufficient number of former corrupt officials who enriched themselves in their time on the "free" money sent from Moscow — continues to rock an already leaking boat. And yet, in their revanchist fervor, the opposition "patriots" cannot even bring themselves to consider that in that boat sits not only the current "president" Aslan Bzhania, not only Security Council Secretary Sergei Shamba or even the entire current "government" team, but all of Abkhazia — the Abkhazian people — who, following years of "friendship" and "partnership" with Russia, find themselves facing a very real danger: being absorbed by the "strategic friend."

That this danger is entirely real is demonstrated, if nothing else, by the document sent from Moscow back at the end of 2019 and actively pushed in recent months through comprehensive pressure on Bzhania's team by Russia's "friends" — the "Program for a Common Social and Economic Space Based on the Harmonization of Legislation," which directly serves the implementation of the Kremlin's annexation plan.

The revanchist opposition figures, hiding behind every manner of pseudo-patriotic slogan — "As long as we live, we will defend the interests of our state, stand guard over the country and the people!"; "We will never support a policy leading to a revision of the war's outcomes!"; "We will not permit the trade expansion of enemy Georgia, which will be the beginning of the end of our statehood!" and so on — simply cannot fail to see the reality of the Russian threat. But the state feeding trough — to which they are apparently being helped to return, once again, by Moscow — is clearly far more important to these "patriots" than all risks, threats, or indeed the future of Abkhazia and its people. There is no other way to explain the behavior of these opposition gentlemen.

They do manage to make use of a certain number of naive citizens for their purposes — though far from all of them. For Abkhazia's population witnessed that Aslan Bzhania assumed the "presidency" in far from easy times: the coronavirus pandemic merely sharpened problems that had been accumulating in Abkhazia over the years with a nudge from the "strategic friend," while also generating new ones. Judging by the numerous publications and comments in the Abkhazian segment of social media, the people recognize that the overwhelming majority of these problems did not arise during Bzhania's administration — and that resolving them all at once, especially under pandemic conditions against the backdrop of Moscow's decision to "assist" its Abkhazian "friends" with a de facto financial and medical blockade, would have been beyond anyone's capacity. At the same time, people remember that many of the current oppositionists personally participated in creating these accumulated problems — and are today trying to pin everything on Bzhania and doing everything in their power to turn the population against his team. And so many have seen behind the oppositionists' patriotic slogans the trivial desire — with Moscow's support — to claw their way back to power, as well as the real plans of their own ally, Russia. "The Russian Federation's years of 'assistance' is a purely politically motivated project with the initial goal of, at the right moment, demanding repayment of the debt — on whatever terms Moscow dictates," writes, for instance, one Abkhazian internet user.

The contours of Russia's demands on Abkhazia were starkly outlined in the aforementioned "Program for a Common Social and Economic Space": the handover to Russia of land and other real estate, energy and other strategic assets; the banning, along Russian lines, of independent media and NGOs — so that no one might, God forbid, subsequently interfere with Russia's complete control over Abkhazia, or think to inform the world of the Kremlin's actions toward the Abkhazian people. In short, everything that leads to outright annexation.

Judging by the increasingly frequent publications in various Abkhazian Telegram channels, many also recognize that in the face of the Russian threat, waiting for assistance from "brotherly" Venezuela, Nicaragua, Syria, and Nauru — or from the so-called South Ossetia, DNR, and LNR — is a hopeless endeavor, and that all of this is complete fantasy, like the very story of their "brotherhood" toward Abkhazia invented by Moscow. For all of them — just like Abkhazia — have been systematically transformed over the years by "friendly" Russia into entities dependent on it: spending billions — to be precise, over the past 20 years, $32 billion on unrecognized and partially recognized republics alone — ostensibly as "friendly assistance," while in reality supporting only regimes friendly to the Kremlin for the purpose of guaranteeing its own geopolitical interests on the ground, without implementing a single project actually designed to ensure their further independent development.

The question is: what can Abkhazia do, finding itself face to face with a far more powerful Russian "friend" that is no longer concealing its intention to absorb it? The opposition has no concrete answers. What it does have are pseudo-patriotic slogans and accusations directed at Aslan Bzhania, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shamba, and other members of the ruling team who are proposing the only possible way out of the impasse — trade and economic cooperation with Tbilisi.

The initiative on the basis of which the opposition veterans' organization Aruaa recently threatened to demand Sergei Shamba's resignation allegedly creates "a threat to the economic and national security of Abkhazia." In an attempt to frighten the population with Georgian "trade expansion to the detriment of local producers, Russian goods, and economic relations with Russia as a whole," Aruaa in its statement predicts "the enrichment of the Georgian economy through the opening of the Abkhazian market, and as a consequence, an increase in the military capabilities of the enemy state" — and finally, "the beginning of the end of Abkhazia's statehood." In doing so, while accusing Bzhania's team of "readiness to implement" the "Step to a Better Future" program proposed by the Georgian government several years ago, Aruaa falls silent on the fact that this program envisages above all the possibility of exporting Abkhazian products to both the Georgian and European markets — on unprecedented preferential terms, and without touching on any political aspects of cooperation whatsoever. In the absence of this clarification, one might have at least considered acceptable the veterans' argument that the implementation of Bzhania's team's initiative, against the backdrop of the Georgian authorities' non-recognition of Abkhazia, creates some form of political threat to it.

Tbilisi's position can be summarized briefly as follows: Russia's intention to annex Abkhazia is entirely obvious — Moscow has already stopped concealing it; the annexation of Abkhazia directly contradicts Georgia's interests, and therefore Tbilisi is a natural ally and real partner for Abkhazia in the matter of salvation from annexation; on this basis, Tbilisi is ready for dialogue and cooperation with the Sukhumi authorities, although it continues not to recognize Abkhazia, has no intention of changing its position on this question, and conceals this from no one; and since virtually no time remains, the sooner the process of cooperation begins, the greater the chances — both for Tbilisi and for Sukhumi itself — of avoiding what neither of them desires: the real annexation of Abkhazia.

In my view, the position is simple enough to understand and contains no duplicity. I am convinced that the pro-Russian corrupt oppositionists — who by every means fair and foul are trying to turn society against Bzhania's team, using above all the subject of trade and economic relations with Tbilisi for this purpose — also understand perfectly well the real state of affairs.

Well-informed sources are already actively speaking of the fact that by mid-March, Moscow — with the help of its Abkhazian associates — will attempt to engineer yet another change of power in Abkhazia. Yes, a population tired of living in extremely difficult conditions certainly has many grievances against Bzhania's team. But will the return to power of former officials — who until very recently were happily helping Russia drive Abkhazia into the dead end of total dependence on Moscow, and are now, willingly or unwillingly, helping it implement its annexation plans — save Abkhazia? That is for the people to decide. But only one step remains to the abyss into which Russia, together with its Abkhazian associates, is attempting to push Abkhazia.

Ekaterine Tsanava

The material was prepared as part of a joint project of the Accent news agency and the non-governmental organization GRASS, implemented with the financial support of the Open Information Partnership (OIP).