For thirty years, the Georgian population remaining in Abkhazia—significantly reduced in number—has continued to exist in its homeland under conditions of severe discrimination. This primarily concerns Georgians of the Gali district—the only district in Abkhazia where Georgians are still allowed to live, albeit with very limited rights.

Let us set aside the radical nationalists who insist on infringing upon Georgians’ rights simply because of their Georgian origin. Instead, let us examine the arguments of that segment of Abkhazians who may genuinely believe that the “Gali reservation” and discrimination against Georgians serve the interests of Sukhumi.

Their main arguments are as follows: if Georgians are granted local “passports” and endowed with civil and political rights, including the right to vote, they will inevitably use these rights to harm Abkhaz interests. Let us ask ourselves—does this really hold true? Or is it possible that certain forces, not only external but also internal, are deliberately embedding this narrative in the Abkhaz public consciousness and misleading people?

Let us imagine for a moment what would happen if Georgians of the Gali district were granted basic human rights. Let us try to view the situation from a narrowly nationalist Abkhaz perspective.

Suppose Georgians managed to elect several deputies to the “parliament” and even to head some “ministry.” How would this contradict the interests of Abkhazians themselves if a few deputies were able to advocate for the rights of the population of the Gali district? What concrete benefit do Abkhazians derive from banning education in one’s native language and transferring it not even to Abkhaz, but to Russian? What harm would be done to national interests if, for example, Georgians were able to speak openly in Abkhazia about the benefits of restoring good relations with Tbilisi? Let us recall that Zurab Achba—a rare intellectual and one of the brightest leaders of Abkhaz nationalism—was once killed precisely for such ideas. And yet even today, some leaders occasionally voice similar thoughts—albeit through the prism of Abkhazia’s independence.

The only thing Sukhumi can achieve through policies that restrict the rights of Georgians is the final depopulation of the district and an even deeper alienation between Georgians and Abkhazians. And yet Sukhumi has repeatedly “officially” articulated a completely opposite goal—the establishment of “good-neighborly” relations with Tbilisi.

Moreover, Sukhumi would like to sign a non-use-of-force document with Tbilisi, which, incidentally, is merely a ruse intended to indirectly extract recognition of “independence,” since Tbilisi has repeatedly undertaken commitments not to use force to resolve the conflict. Therefore, placing the issue of “recognition of independence” by Tbilisi on the same level as ending discrimination is an entirely non-constructive approach, doomed to failure.

In general, such discrimination in the 21st century can only warm the hearts of people who are not entirely healthy. Most importantly, it is counterproductive, as it cannot fail to provoke a reciprocal attitude toward Abkhazians within Georgian society.

Thus, the discrimination of the Georgian population brings only negatives—not only for Georgians, but also for Abkhazians. And whoever plays on absolutely irrational fears, pits peoples against one another, and fuels Georgiaphobia, is clearly guided not by the strategic interests of Abkhazians—even if he is a veteran and a “Hero of the War,” and Abkhaz by nationality a thousand times over.

Moreover, if one thinks about it, by discriminating against Georgians, Abkhazians lose their most reliable ally in resisting the Russian threat of fully absorbing Abkhazia. It is well known that the minds and hearts of the still largely silent Armenian and Russian-speaking communities are oriented toward the Kremlin, and when Moscow decides that “hour X” has come for Abkhazia, they will undoubtedly make themselves known.

The instinct of self-preservation should prompt Abkhazians to understand that in such a situation they will have no allies or friends left except their own Abkhaz Georgians. Georgians certainly do not sympathize with Moscow, and therefore, strange as it may seem, they are the natural allies even of the most hard-line Abkhaz nationalists. And that means the most logical course would be not to oppress their own Georgians, but on the contrary—to stand by them and hold on to them.

Razden Kajaya