The Tskhinvali precedent: Why Moscow stripped Ossetian “deputies” of citizenship
12/03/2024 13:49:20 Conflicts
An extremely unpleasant piece of news arrived in Tskhinvali the other day. One Russian official of not particularly high rank, with a single stroke of the pen, stripped three entire “deputies of the parliament of South Ossetia” — Garry Muldarov, David Sanakoev, and Dzambolat Medoev — of their Russian citizenship.
According to the wording of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), sanctions were applied against them “for actions threatening the national security of Russia.” Specifically, as stated in the notification on the deprivation of citizenship, the reason lies in “actions leading to an escalation of tension near Russia’s border.”
Let us recall that under the latest version of the Law “On Citizenship,” adopted in Russia last year, the FSB has the right to revoke acquired citizenship from foreign nationals whose actions threaten the country’s security, regardless of when such actions were committed. In addition, acquired citizenship may also be revoked in other cases: for public calls for actions aimed against the territorial integrity of the state; for discrediting the Armed Forces; or, for example, for participation in an undesirable foreign or international organization — that is, those very “foreign agents,” the law on whom the Kremlin is currently actively pressuring Sukhumi to adopt.
The strange and vague wording used by the FSB has left ample room for a wide range of interpretations; however, in Tskhinvali they generally believe that the decision was influenced by the “Georgian lobby” in Russia.
So what actually happened, and why did the FSB suddenly turn against Ossetian politicians? The answer to this question most likely lies in the internal political situation in Tskhinvali.
It should be noted that the aforementioned trio actively lobbied for a revision of the “state border” with Georgia and sought to expand the territory of “South Ossetia” by an additional 200 square kilometers. However, during a visit to Tskhinvali last autumn, Moscow’s curator — Igor Maslov, Head of the Directorate of the Russian Presidential Administration for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries — warned that such initiatives could provoke “undesirable processes in Georgia which could ultimately undermine the already fragile stability in the region.” At the same time, information leaked to the media that one of the security officers accompanying the curator hinted to a local politician that his activity could lead to the loss of Russian citizenship.
In addition, in private conversations in Tskhinvali it is said that the trio deprived of Russian citizenship represented a faction of “patriots.” That is, they are unequivocal supporters of the idea of “independence,” rather than joining the Russian Federation. Therefore, many do not rule out that precisely this position may have been the real reason behind the odious incident.
The “dispossessed” are currently attempting to challenge the FSB’s decision in a Russian court. However, it is not yet certain that they will even be able to leave Tskhinvali for the territory of the Russian Federation, where the case is to be heard.
David Sanakoev has found himself in the most difficult position. A warrant for his arrest has been issued by the International Criminal Court in The Hague for alleged war crimes committed during the “five-day war” of 2008. Now he has also been left without Russian citizenship.
Let us recall that Russia unilaterally began the illegal borderization of occupied Georgian territories immediately after the end of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Over this time, Russian border guards have detained hundreds of local residents of Georgian ethnicity along the dividing line. As a rule, after arrest, people are taken to the Tskhinvali detention facility, where some detainees are held for years. In addition, cases of killings of peaceful Georgian residents by Russian and Ossetian security forces periodically occur in the occupation zone. Russian border guards also do not demonstrate much humanity during the borderization process itself. Local residents lose not only land plots, but also ancestral cemeteries and even ancient churches. There are frequent cases in which Russian troops stretch barbed wire directly through courtyards in such a way that a house and its surrounding land end up on opposite sides of the occupation line. Therefore, suspecting Moscow of sentimentality toward the authorities and people of Georgia and searching for a Georgian trace in this story is simply foolish.
Sometimes Russia’s decisions are dictated by extremely simple and understandable interests. At present, Moscow is very reluctant to escalate relations with Tbilisi. Therefore, anyone who attempts to interfere with this course is automatically deemed an enemy. But this does not mean that fears in Tskhinvali — that the Kremlin might someday hand them over to Tbilisi — are entirely unfounded. One cannot completely rule out the possibility of such a turn in the future, but not here and not now.
The most important aspect of this story is the very precedent of Russia depriving three Ossetian “deputies” of citizenship for being overly zealous in intruding into spheres of responsibility and competence reserved for Moscow.
Now even the most ardent supporters of Russia, including in Abkhazia and, of course, in Tskhinvali, have been shown through a vivid example that swearing eternal loyalty to Russia and carrying out any orders handed down from the Kremlin is no longer sufficient. None of this guarantees the master’s loyalty in return. At best, the Kremlin needs only compliant notaries who unquestioningly carry out all directives of the elder brother.
Razden Kajaya


