It so happened that the opposing antipodes—Sukhumi and Tbilisi—have today found themselves in almost identical circumstances: they are threatened by the same adversary, and their future fate largely depends on how the current situation is resolved.
Both in Tbilisi and in Sukhumi today, intense disputes revolve around the foreign agents law. The Georgian version bears a somewhat more modest title—“the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence,” while in Abkhazia, without much reflection, they decided to retain the term “foreign agents”—although in essence it is the same thing.
In Abkhazia, this initiative stands squarely behind Russia, openly and without any doubt. There, the bill is presented as part of a package together with other laws that are meant to ensure the harmonization of Abkhaz and Russian legislation—that is, in essence, to create a foundation for neutralizing public debate, silencing political opponents, and then for the almost complete absorption of Abkhazia by Russia.
In Georgia, since it is an internationally recognized state and the goal of its creeping annexation is not formally on Moscow’s agenda, the context of the foreign agents law is different. There is no single view as to the motivation: either Russia directly raised the necessity of adopting the law with the ruling Georgian Dream party, or the party’s leader himself, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, decided to initiate it, believing it would help him prolong his rule indefinitely.
Be that as it may, regardless of motivation, the outcome in both cases appears similar: Sukhumi will gradually become part of Krasnodar Krai (de facto), while Tbilisi will turn into an externally isolated, weak state fully under Russia’s influence.
This, of course, will not happen quickly—not within a month, and perhaps not even within a year or two—but the process will clearly move precisely in this direction, which is Russia’s ultimate objective both in Sukhumi and in Tbilisi.
Both societies, Georgian and Abkhaz alike, are resisting the foreign agents bill in every way they can: everything is being used—from collective protest statements by entire organizations and associations to mass street demonstrations.
For the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that at present the Georgian protest is brighter, louder, and more numerous, while the Abkhaz protest is more effective and practical. We clearly see that official Sukhumi is in no hurry to adopt the foreign agents law and has been dragging out the process for several years. According to earlier plans, it was supposed to be put to a vote at the beginning of 2024, yet in recent weeks the draft has effectively been shelved—it is not being discussed, and no one knows when it will be adopted. Most likely, the Bzhaniya administration, understanding the unpopularity of such a step, is in no rush to follow the instructions of its curators.
In Tbilisi, by contrast, the ruling party is in such a hurry that it does not care about public opinion or the position of the younger generation. Georgian Dream is effectively trying to break the country’s tomorrow—the youth, whom it considers the main threat to its power. Parliament has already passed the law in the first reading and is now discussing it in the second, and there is little doubt that the ruling party will attempt to push the law through to the end by any means necessary—truthful or otherwise—through blackmail, manipulation, bribery, and direct violence.
Although the root cause in both cases is the same—Russia—we observe two radically opposite models of behavior. The Abkhaz authorities do not wish to enter into a head-on confrontation with their own people and are doing everything possible to sabotage the adoption of the foreign agents law. The Georgian authorities, on the other hand, are ready to sacrifice the country, deprive it of its future, just to adopt a law that they consider necessary.
The fundamental difference is this: it turns out that Aslan Bzhaniya is far more attentive to the opinion of his people, far more accountable to them, and such abstract notions as conscience or morality are not alien to him. In Tbilisi, by contrast, there is a perfect storm. The country’s chief ruler, oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, is a being without honor, without conscience, without empathy, and likely with serious psychological deviations. Unlike Aslan Bzhaniya, he views political opponents as enemies with whom any compromise is excluded. The level of hatred toward dissenters emanating from Vladimir Putin is child’s play compared to the stream of absolute hatred radiated both by the oligarch himself and by his subordinates.
These are the initial conditions. There is also a difference in social structure, which determines the fact that Sukhumi refrains for months from adopting repressive laws, while Tbilisi rushes headlong toward Putin-style authoritarianism.
In Abkhazia—freedom prevails. State institutions are either weak or nonexistent; law-enforcement and punitive bodies are practically absent. Aslan Bzhaniya might be glad to disperse this disorder, but lacks the means to do so. There are no levers. The advantage of this system lies precisely in the greater dependence of the authorities on public opinion and their inability to ignore society entirely. The reverse side—the disadvantage—is the impossibility of any state-building, including sound state-building. Anarchy, as is known, is the mother of order—but of a peculiar kind.
In Tbilisi, by contrast, there is strong authority, functioning institutions, an effective bureaucracy, and capable security services. The advantage of this system is that it makes it easier to build a modern, civilized state. The downside is that the authorities feel more secure and therefore can afford to disregard public opinion.
Be that as it may, the challenge facing both Abkhaz and Georgians today is identical, as is the choice. For both Abkhaz and—especially—Georgians, salvation lies in Europe.
For Abkhaz, who have for many years lived under propaganda claiming that “there is nothing and no one in Europe except LGBT, and Europeans will definitely demand that everyone become gay,” this may seem strange. But in reality, the very fact that Abkhaz are burdened by the emerging authoritarian regime and the defective Russian system of governance is clear evidence that somewhere deep down, at a subconscious level, they feel an attraction toward Europe.
Today, both Georgians and Abkhaz are under pressure from Moscow, which is capable of burying both. Russia is a one-way ticket. It is precisely this ticket that they are now trying to sell to us all.
Tengiz Ablogia
