On the eve of the cold season, one of the main concerns troubling residents of Abkhazia for the past fifteen years has been the energy sector. Power outages and disruptions to related utilities create problems for the population, which the authorities have most often tried to resolve locally by requesting electricity flows from Russia. And while in previous years Moscow used funds from its investment program to help Abkhazia mitigate the energy crisis, 2023 became an exception in every sense.

It all began with preliminary negotiations between Abkhaz authorities and representatives of Russia’s Ministry of Energy in early autumn. Concrete agreements were still far off, but for the first time in a long while Moscow demanded an advance payment from the Abkhaz side for the electricity the republic requested during the period of shortage. According to various unofficial sources, Russia insisted on an extremely inflated tariff that the republic’s budget would not be able to sustain. The figure mentioned was 6 rubles per kilowatt-hour. According to the same unofficial information, the Abkhaz side, represented in the negotiations by Minister of Economy Kristina Ozgan, managed to agree on a lower tariff in exchange for the transfer of the diversion hydropower plants located in the Gali district of Abkhazia. These diversion stations are part of the unified Inguri Hydropower Plant complex and have not been operating for 30 years.

Later, the unofficial information regarding the transit tariff was confirmed by the head of Chernomorenergo, Timur Dzhindzholia. According to him, for a transit of 30 million kWh, Abkhazia will pay 135 million rubles, that is, 4 rubles per kWh. At the current level of electricity consumption, this volume will be sufficient for 12 days. What happens next remains unknown.

It should be noted that the republic, which previously had a much larger population and where factories, plants, and other industries were operating, never experienced energy supply problems. Moreover, most electricity-generating facilities operated at only half capacity. Of course, that was during the Soviet Union, with a unified system that supplied all republics with the required amount of electricity. Since then, not only has the country changed, but so has the population living, for example, here in Abkhazia. In other words, the unified energy chain no longer exists, but the republic inherited the Inguri Hydropower Plant — the largest hydropower station in the Caucasus, with a capacity of 1,300 MW and an average annual electricity generation of more than 4 million kWh. The hydropower plant itself is fully maintained by Georgia, which not only provides qualified specialists and pays salaries, but also carries out all current and capital repairs. Under the agreement with Georgia, Abkhazia receives 40% of the total generated electricity, namely about 2 million kWh. As you can understand, this is more than sufficient for a population of 250,000.

In theory, this is true. But in reality, after President Bzhania gave the green light and the government allowed cryptocurrency mining, electricity became catastrophically insufficient in the republic, even taking into account the flow from Russia. In winter, people were left without electricity for 5–7 hours a day. And it was precisely during this period that Bzhania suddenly began proposing that Russian investors be allowed to participate in the modernization of Abkhazia’s energy sector.

At first, there were no concrete details. Officially, there still are none. However, various proposals in writing began to appear from time to time either in the Presidential Administration or in Parliament, and all of them concerned both the energy sector as a whole and its individual components.

Let us return to the diversion hydropower plants, of which there are four in the Gali district. One operates year-round, while the other three have been looted. Russia has always shown heightened interest in these facilities, and every time attempts were made to take them over as property, the Abkhaz authorities cut those efforts off at the root.

At the same time, Inguri HPP itself has, over the past three years, repeatedly tried to negotiate with both the Ministry of Economy of Abkhazia and the relevant company Chernomorenergo on restoring the diversion hydropower plants with the help of Georgian and international banks. Each time, however, the response was a refusal. And now it becomes clear why.

Recently, a document was submitted to the Abkhaz parliament according to which a Russian company leasing the Sukhum HPP wishes to acquire the diversion hydropower plants as property. Parliament, like the executive branch, did not comment on this information. However, the curtain was recently lifted by the head of Chernomorenergo, who said that the deal concerns not three diversion stations but Cascade No. 2. According to Timur Dzhindzholia, the draft agreement was approved by an order of Prime Minister Alexander Ankvab, and the Cabinet of Ministers will submit this document to Parliament for final approval.

This information was also confirmed by the former general director of Chernomorenergo, now a member of Parliament, Rezo Zantaria, who stated that he is “working on this project.”

If we consider all that is happening together with the Action Plan for Optimizing Energy Supply in the Republic of Abkhazia — the so-called “Road Map” — it becomes clear where Abkhazia is being led.

According to the document adopted in July 2021 at the Russian-Abkhaz intergovernmental commission, which no one has seen in full except the commission members themselves, electricity tariffs in the republic will be raised over five years to the level of Russian tariffs, or even higher. The energy facilities themselves will be modernized and transferred into the ownership of Russian companies and investors. But there is one catch: Abkhazia has a law that prohibits any form of alienation of energy facilities from state ownership.

How this law will be circumvented, and what amendments will be adopted to finally allow Russians to obtain one of Abkhazia’s vital sectors, remains unclear. Quite recently, following a well-trodden path, an option was proposed to transfer facilities into long-term (49-year) lease, which in Abkhaz reality essentially differs little from transferring ownership — and no one knows what will happen to us in 50 years anyway. However, a final decision has not yet been made.

If one thinks about it, Russia has territorial claims against Abkhazia — Aibga. The bridge connecting Abkhazia and Russia across the Psou River has already been transferred into Russian ownership. Military bases occupy nearly a quarter of the republic’s territory. The most desirable pieces of coastal land already belong to Russian officials and oligarchs. The only airport in Abkhazia is already in Moscow’s hands. Energy remains. And to resolve this issue, Russia appears to have begun resorting to desperate measures, for which it is prepared to bring all of Abkhazia to its knees.

The text contains toponyms and terminology used in the self-proclaimed Abkhazia.