A veteran of the 1992–1993 armed conflict in Abkhazia and public figure Lasha Zukhba recently stirred Abkhaz society quite profoundly with his statement in support of citizens of Georgia protesting the law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence,” or, more plainly, the foreign agents law.
“On my own behalf and on behalf of my like-minded colleagues, I express solidarity with the protesters in Tbilisi, the Georgian opposition, and the entire civil society of Georgia in their protest against the adoption of the law on foreign influence. We remember your support for our protest against the Pitsunda agreement, and the protest against the foreign agents law is still ahead of us. I hope your efforts will not be in vain and that the law will not be adopted. I am convinced that no nation, and the Georgian nation in particular, is invincible in its determination. I wish you strength of spirit and success in achieving your goal,” Zukhba wrote on social media, thereby provoking the expected criticism, primarily from representatives of veterans’ organizations, including the pro-government “Amtsakhara” and the opposition “Aruaa.”
For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that this was already the second highly resonant statement by Lasha Zukhba for Abkhaz society within a short period of time. It is worth recalling that after the ratification in Sukhumi of the agreement on the alienation of the state dacha “Pitsunda” in favor of the Russian Federation, he published a brief but meaningful text on social media: “Heaviness is when, after 30 years, you realize that you fought on the wrong side.”
At that time, however, Zukhba went no further than those words. Now, following the publication of his resonant post, he gave a lengthy interview to the “Apsnykhabar” studio and once again violated an unspoken taboo that had been strictly observed in Abkhaz society throughout the entire 30 post-conflict years. Zukhba said what until now had been difficult to imagine in the public domain, namely that he does not consider the entire Georgian people to be enemies, did not think so even when he fought against Georgia, and most likely will never think so.
The unusually benevolent tone and spirit toward the Georgian people in the interview of a war veteran well known in Abkhaz society apparently became a kind of shock therapy—on both sides of the Inguri River. But why did these statements emerge precisely here and now?
In fact, Lasha Zukhba merely articulated concerns that have intensified in Abkhazia in recent times, linked to what is perceived as a demonstrative shift by Georgia’s ruling party away from its declared pro-Western foreign policy course, occurring against the backdrop of warming relations with the Russian Federation. In Sukhumi, it is believed that the draft law on foreign influence could play an almost key role in reformatting Russian-Georgian relations from a conflict-based agenda to one of friendliness, and possibly even alliance. As a logical development of such rapprochement, Sukhumi does not exclude the possibility of a behind-the-scenes Russian-Georgian deal involving Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia.
“Interpreted, not without reason, by the Georgian opposition as intended to suppress resistance to Russian-Georgian geopolitical rapprochement, the foreign agents law, if adopted by the parliament in Tbilisi, could serve as a powerful factor in shaping new realities in the South Caucasus. Realities in which the economic and regional partnership between the Russian Federation and Georgia would push the idea of European integration of our neighbors into the background. And then… who knows what compromises would be reached and who would become the object of those compromises. Abkhazia,” wrote another well-known opposition figure, Akhra Bzhaniya.
Journalist Inal Khashig reasons similarly, believing that what is happening indicates that Georgia’s informal ruler, Bidzina Ivanishvili, is prepared to part with the European Union in the name of restoring the country’s territorial integrity.
And against the backdrop of such doubts intensifying in Sukhumi, it became known that the “minister of foreign affairs,” Inal Ardzynba—who had been appointed at Moscow’s behest—was dismissed.
Abkhaz society also did not fail to note that the de facto president Aslan Bzhaniya relieved Ardzynba of his position on the day of the inauguration of Russian President Vladimir Putin, while remaining in Sukhumi rather than attending the ceremonial event in the Kremlin, to which he apparently was not invited this time. Neither the Abkhaz nor the Tskhinvali leaders were present at the parade held on Red Square on May 9.
Thus, the concerns voiced in Sukhumi may appear at first glance not entirely unfounded, although they lack a crucial component—the interests and position of Moscow, the main actor determining the resolution of the issue of Georgia’s territorial integrity. The fundamental question is this: why should the Kremlin make concessions to Tbilisi if the political force ruling Georgia itself is rapidly spoiling relations with Western strategic allies—Russia’s geopolitical adversaries—and steadily drawing the country into Russia’s orbit?
What can Tbilisi offer today’s Russia in exchange for territorial integrity—neutrality, renunciation of the EU and NATO? Has Moscow outlined the conditions under which it would be prepared to consider the possibility of Georgia’s reunification?
The Kremlin fully understands that a leader who succeeds in resolving the issue of restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity would receive a carte blanche from the population for lifelong rule. He would be permitted virtually anything—even abandoning the pro-Western vector and returning to the Russian sphere, if that were the price of reunification. The Kremlin does not conceal its satisfaction with Bidzina Ivanishvili’s course and its interest in keeping “Georgian Dream” in power, yet it remains silent on Georgia’s principal problem. There are no indications whatsoever—not even the faintest hints—that Moscow is prepared to move even remotely toward a prospect of resolving Georgia’s territorial integrity issue.
On the other hand, parliamentary elections will be held in Georgia in October, and “Georgian Dream” is highly interested in spreading rumors about a possible hypothetical deal on territorial integrity. But if the ruling party truly held such a powerful trump card as even preliminary promises on territorial integrity, would it not use it? Therefore, the silence of “Georgian Dream,” which does not respond to such versions, also speaks for itself.
Meanwhile, in Sukhumi there is open discussion about how Moscow has asked the de facto leaders to take a time-out from negative rhetoric toward official Tbilisi. We see how policies of Georgia’s current authorities are being viewed favorably in Moscow and Sukhumi alike. This context also fits with the sudden return of Inal Ardzynba to Russia, as well as the absence of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali’s de facto leaders at the Moscow parade, ostensibly to weaken opposition sentiments within the Georgian electorate.
According to analyst Paata Zakareishvili, on the eve of the Georgian elections Moscow will support the illusion of a certain thaw in the Tbilisi–Sukhumi–Tskhinvali triangle. It cannot be ruled out that some symbolic gestures of goodwill may follow—for example, some easing of movement across the de facto borders—which would undoubtedly provide electoral assistance to “Georgian Dream.” However, this idyll will dissipate like fog immediately after the elections, Zakareishvili is convinced.
Thus, Moscow will support “Georgian Dream” in order to help it win the elections, but there will be no deal on Sukhumi and Tskhinvali—neither with this nor with any other Georgian government, even a fully pro-Russian one—until changes occur within Russia itself.
Razhdен Kadzhaya
