Various epidemics, like natural disasters, always strike humanity unexpectedly, and therefore it is simply impossible to meet them in full “combat readiness.” One can only constantly keep this danger in mind and try to remain as prepared as possible. However, as the global coronavirus pandemic clearly demonstrated, even this does not always work, and not for everyone—even for the most developed countries, whose economies nearly collapsed before the eyes of the whole world…

What can be said about Abkhazia, where the economy, in the classical sense of the word, practically does not exist: for almost 30 years neither the successive local rulers nor the “strategic partner” and “big friend” Russia have done anything for its development; the Abkhaz budget was largely replenished through Russian inflows, which in recent years had been decreasing, and during the pandemic—as if by ill fate—dried up altogether. There are no “backup options” whatsoever, since no one thought for years about an alternative to Russian assistance, and the word “diversification” seems to have been deliberately removed from use. The result is a de facto economic collapse… The population is also unable to help itself—the small private tourism business, on which many local families relied in summer, was also shut down with the closure of the Russian border… In short—it is a nightmare…

To find oneself at such a time and under such conditions as the new ruler of Abkhazia—one would not wish that upon one’s enemy… However, the opposition, which only a couple of months ago was itself in power and therefore bears no less responsibility for the current deplorable situation, decided not to miss the moment: instead of putting political ambitions aside and joining the effort to lead Abkhazia out of the crisis, it intensified its actions against the ruling team of Aslan Bzhania, and not always by fair methods. And since the new authorities have declared a fight against corruption—which is not the least reason for the current economic collapse—the principle of “the best defense is offense” proved quite suitable for the opposition wing of former “president” Raul Khajimba. And now, offering nothing concrete themselves, opposition forces are trying to present all initiatives of Bzhania’s team as obviously useless, and at times even “anti-state” and “treacherous.”

For more than two weeks now, heated debates have not subsided in Abkhazia regarding “attempts to revise the sovereignty and independence of the Republic.” This danger was perceived simultaneously from two directions: from the “strategic partner” Russia and from the “Tbilisi–Bzhania team tandem.”

In the first case, fertile ground for unrest was created by the daring initiative of the little-known leader of the recently created Russian party “For Truth,” Mr. Prilepin, to “urgently hold referendums and annex to Russia” Abkhazia, the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, other unrecognized and partially recognized republics of the post-Soviet space, and at the same time Belarus. Practically all political and public organizations of Abkhazia, as well as social media users, demonstrated their anger over this issue. Official statements were circulated by the Abkhaz “parliament” and the “ministry of foreign affairs.” Aslan Bzhania personally apparently decided prudently to remain silent; however, rather sharp statements were disseminated by political parties and movements affiliated with him (“People’s Front of Abkhazia,” “Amtsakhara,” etc.). Meanwhile, forces supporting the previous authorities (the veterans’ public organization “Aruaa,” the party “Forum for the National Unity of Abkhazia”) condemned Prilepin’s initiative in a milder form: “Aruaa” proposed inviting this gentleman and other Russian figures who think similarly to Abkhazia for a “peaceful and civilized clarification of the realities to them.”

In the second case, concern was caused by statements from Aslan Bzhania about the possibility of dialogue and cooperation with Tbilisi, including in the sphere of trade. In particular, on July 3 the “president” stated that he “does not demand recognition from Tbilisi, but a non-use of force agreement would create opportunities for humanitarian, economic, and any other dialogue,” and that “as soon as this point is implemented, everything will be very, very good.”

Bzhania had expressed readiness under certain conditions to begin dialogue with Tbilisi even earlier—in the very first days of his “presidency.” At that time, his statements caused considerable excitement in Tbilisi and concern and bewilderment in Sukhumi, which subsequently required him to clarify several times what exactly he meant. And on July 3 Bzhania, in principle, did not say anything new; however, for the team of his predecessor, dialogue and cooperation with Tbilisi is a “tempting” reason to accuse the current authorities of all mortal sins—and they are gladly using it.

Thus, “Aruaa” published on Facebook an appeal to the speaker and deputies of the Abkhaz “parliament,” in which it effectively labeled Bzhania’s initiative a “treacherous concession” and demanded parliamentary hearings with his participation in order to “once and for all clearly clarify the foreign policy vision of the current authorities”:

“[…] We consider any official trade with the enemy state […] a treacherous concession that will lead to the beginning of Georgia’s trade expansion and the beginning of the end of our state, which is confirmed by independent experts. There is no shortage of goods in Abkhazia; everything necessary for the country comes from Russia or by sea from other countries.”

Exactly which arguments of which “independent experts” “Aruaa” relies on is not specified in the statement. For understandable reasons, it also does not empha how much more expensive products arriving from Russia and “overseas countries” are compared to those coming from territory controlled by the Georgian authorities.

Opposition media have also joined the matter. For example, an article by journalist Izida Chania contains several messages to the population of Abkhazia approximately as follows: Russian financial assistance ceased because of the coming to power of Bzhania’s team, and as long as it remains, waiting for the resumption of assistance is useless; Because of a “radical change in the global political order,” Russia has lost all obligations to Abkhazia, and therefore, despite the cessation of financial assistance precisely during the most difficult period of the pandemic, there are no grounds to be offended at Moscow; Russia remains the only alternative partner, since Russian military bases in Abkhazia “stopped the many-year terrorist war of Georgia in our country”; Bzhania’s team has no plan to exit the crisis situation, and the positive “fake expectations” created by it regarding cooperation with Tbilisi are merely a “trap destructive for Abkhaz statehood,” and if the population of Abkhazia falls into it, it will have to “pay very dearly, and not only with money”; Bzhania is “very lucky” to rule in conditions that none of his predecessors had (“the old opposition has exhausted itself, the new one has not yet been born, and society is tired of coups”), yet instead of using this “unique opportunity” to “work on legislation, seek ways out of the economic crisis within the country, reduce officials, strengthen self-government bodies, introduce a control system, carry out reforms, and so on,” he is occupied with “persecuting political opponents,” promoting “another scam,” and “projects destructive for Abkhazia.”

It would probably be good to read in the same article answers to the questions that arise by themselves: For what specific reason did Russian financing cease with the coming to power of Bzhania’s team? Why, in the most difficult period of the pandemic, can assistance from a “strategic partner” depend on whether it likes a particular Abkhaz ruler or not?—the fraternal Abkhaz people are in an extremely difficult situation anyway and need support; What specific “radical change in the global political order” releases Russia, the “big friend,” from at least moral obligations to assist Abkhazia, which has found itself in a stalemate situation? Why was everything that the journalist now, in the “unprecedentedly comfortable conditions” of a global pandemic, demands overnight from the newly arrived Bzhania team not done by all predecessors (including Raul Khajimba) over almost 30 years? Why exactly are dialogue and cooperation with Tbilisi a “destructive project” and a “scam”? But Chania gives no answers to these questions...

Bzhania himself did not respond to the criticism of political opponents, but a sharp counterstatement was circulated by the pro-government party “Amtsakhara.” It reminded opposition forces that the issue of relations with Tbilisi arose immediately after the end of the war and that even the first “president” Vladislav Ardzinba spoke about its necessity; that “opening borders and establishing legal trade relations with neighboring countries is a breakthrough in the economy” and that “a state cannot be independent without a developed economy, a well-equipped army, with a poor population, large-scale corruption, and total unemployment.” At the same time, “Amtsakhara” hinted that certain representatives of the opposition have a personal interest in preserving the contraband trade, and now that the new authorities have declared a fight against corruption and other types of economic crime, through their “populist statements” they are merely trying to escape possible criminal liability:

“Speaking about the impossibility of trade and opening the border with Georgia, ‘Aruaa’ is being disingenuous and, possibly, is trying to quickly turn its own business into politics. Illegal economic activity has been going on for more than one year—contraband across the Ingur River into the territory of Abkhazia. It is quite possible that such a situation suits those who enjoy the exclusive right to illegal enrichment. […] The time has come to answer for everything.”

The initiative of Bzhania was also supported by “United Abkhazia.” Alongside the assertion that “the issue of Abkhazia’s sovereignty and statehood cannot be subject to revision,” the party points out the inadmissibility of “ignoring the reality that in the absence of political ties Abkhazia de facto has ties with Georgia—the Inguri HPP, trade turnover, Georgian citizens residing in Abkhazia,” and that “ignoring the situation or acting through prohibitions will lead to nothing good” and that “it is necessary to develop a formula of interaction acceptable for the Abkhaz state and society.” In addition, the party considers it erroneous to believe that legalization of the existing trade turnover is a “concession to Tbilisi”—“on the contrary, the establishment of customs posts would in fact mean the establishment of a full-fledged border with Georgia.”

On July 14, the foreign policy vision of Bzhania’s team was officially clarified by the Abkhaz “ministry of foreign affairs.” Its statement contains three main messages: “The signing with Georgia of an agreement excluding the resumption of hostilities, the guarantor of which will be authoritative international organizations, is a priority task of Abkhazia’s foreign policy at this historical stage”; “Abkhazia is a sovereign independent state whose political status is enshrined in the Constitution and is not subject to revision under any circumstances”; “The authorities of Abkhazia adhere to the principle of openness and readiness to build full-fledged and equal relations with all interested partners who share similar approaches and demonstrate respect for Abkhazia’s sovereignty.”

Despite the official clarification by the Abkhaz “MFA,” the “parliament” nevertheless decided to hold hearings on the foreign policy vision of Bzhania’s team—in relation to both Moscow and Tbilisi. Debates in an expanded format—with the involvement of all interested parties—are planned. The first committee hearings began today.

Whether Aslan Bzhania’s initiative will have any continuation—the near future will show. However, the fact remains that the idea of possible dialogue and cooperation with Tbilisi, which just a couple of weeks ago in Abkhazia few even dared to pronounce aloud, has now become the subject of wide discussion. And not only in political circles.

“Now many have responded to this matter. People understand: we need to build the country, we need to develop real state institutions, the economy, and only then can we talk about some kind of independence, independence in many issues. Now it all kind of exists, but we are largely dependent, and in many ways, it seems to me, we have already somewhat tired our strategic partner, because it is impossible to feed us forever. They probably also hope for some kind of reciprocal movement, that we will not only absorb tranches here, but also somehow develop ourselves,” believes the chairman of the Abkhaz society “Inva-Sodeistvie,” Alkhas Tkhagushev.

As for ordinary residents of Abkhazia, opinions differ here.

“As long as we do not have a peace agreement and official relations with Georgia, I consider conversations on this topic unacceptable. I don’t know what happened with Moscow, for what reason assistance was reduced—and it’s not my business… The situation we have found ourselves in naturally does not please me, nor can it please any normal person. But I am sure there is some other path—it is not for me to look for it, that is what we have authorities for, let them seek, find and do it quickly,” says a resident of Gagra, Z.A.

“Let’s start with what everyone has known for a long time but does not say out loud—trade is flourishing and a certain circle of people is profiting from it. If all this is legalized, brought under the law, and if legal trade will be beneficial for our state, replenish the budget, etc., I do not see reasons why not proceed with it?!” says a resident of Sukhumi, G.K.

As for Moscow—or at least one of the Kremlin towers, judging by the activation in recent days in social networks of the so-called Kremlin trolls—the wide discussion in Abkhazia of the above-mentioned issues clearly did not sit well with them.

In this new reality, much, apparently, will depend on how thoughtfully, cautiously, and far-sightedly Tbilisi acts. Whether it will act at all and how exactly—time will show.

Meanwhile, “Accent” asked the Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality to once again, briefly, in simple and understandable language for everyone, clarify what exactly Tbilisi proposes and under what conditions in terms of trade. And our Abkhaz readers themselves will decide whether these proposals are “destructive for Abkhaz statehood” and whether Abkhazia, which today finds itself in a stalemate situation, needs all this:

The peace initiative of the Government of Georgia “A Step to a Better Future” creates the opportunity for trade and, in general, economic activity along the dividing lines under a depoliticized approach and using exclusively status-neutral instruments. Specifically, registration of a person residing in Abkhazia as a producer entity is carried out without requiring him or her to accept Georgian citizenship, on the basis of an individual number assigned on the basis of the Abkhaz documents in his or her possession. At the same time, the business entity is exempt from paying profit tax, value added tax, and turnover tax.

Mari Mdzeluri

The text contains toponyms and terminology used in the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia

The material was prepared within the framework of a joint project of the information agency “Accent” and the non-governmental organization GRASS, implemented with the financial support of the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Georgia